StratEdge CapitalAI SYSTEMS · INTELLIGENCE

Founder research · Regulatory public comment

Make authorization unavoidable at signing.

On October 13, 2026, Tarik Zahedi submitted a five-page technical comment to the SEC concerning proposed adviser and regulated fund custody rules. The argument: authorization only works when an asset transfer cannot bypass the approval boundary.

Original document

SEC File No. S7-2026-35 · October 13, 2026 · Five pages

Adviser and Regulated Fund Custody Rules; Crypto Custody Rules

Read the SEC-hosted PDF

What the letter actually recommends

Four controls that reinforce one another.

These are the recommendations advanced in the founder's submitted letter, organized by the document's own sections and page references. They are not represented as adopted SEC rules or independently certified product capabilities.

01

Enforce approval where the transfer is signed

Pages 1–2 · Question 70

The comment argues that approvals can be bypassed if the signing component accepts instructions through another route. The signing step itself should require proof of the designated persons' approval for the particular transfer.

02

Show approvers the actual transaction

Page 4 · Blind signing

Reviewers should see details derived from the transaction presented for signing, not merely a description supplied by the system initiating it.

03

Apply limits and escalation before release

Pages 3–4 · Questions 57 and 72

Per-transaction and rolling-period size or velocity controls, holds for human review, and separately authorized changes to destination allowlists are presented as complementary safeguards.

04

Separate authorities and preserve independent records

Pages 3–4 · Questions 73 and 77

The letter distinguishes software that can hold or block an action from software that grants authorization. It recommends keeping the required human authorization independent and storing the authorization record outside the executing system.

The core engineering issue

An approval in an application is not always an approval at the signer.

The submission discusses public incident reports in which operational controls were bypassed or automatic release lacked effective limits. It uses those reports to argue for enforcement that cannot be skipped by sending a different instruction directly to the signing component.

An engineering team can use this as a set of design questions: What can reach the signer? What exact transaction is approved? Who can stop execution? What happens when a limit is reached? Can the audit record survive a compromised executing system?

The incident descriptions are drawn from the submitted comment and its citations; they are not separate incident audits performed by StratEdge Capital.

Source and company attribution

Written in the Workflow Systems capacity.

The October 13 letter identifies Tarik Zahedi as founder and chief executive of StratEdge Workflow Systems LLC. It identifies CryptOps.ai as a live transaction-control platform built by Workflow Systems at the time of submission.

Capital and Workflow share the same individual owner but are distinct companies. Capital's future engineering plans do not retroactively reassign the product's prior work or establish an IP transfer.

How the companies connect

Publication vs implementation

Research informs the roadmap. It does not certify the software.

The comment proposes safeguards. A production implementation requires its own code review, tests, deployment evidence and operational controls. Publication on SEC.gov does not establish agency approval, regulatory compliance, customer results or security certification.

Continue reading

Review the full letter with its cited notes, then explore the distinct CryptOps product experience and the wider technical approach.

Explore the rest of the founder's research.

All publications